Iran's Activities in Africa
Introduction
Iran’s engagement with Africa has entered a new phase since 2023, marked by a rekindled diplomatic drive and ambitious outreach under President Ebrahim Raisi’s administration 1 . Historically, Iran’s Africa policy has oscillated – from the revolutionary zeal of the 1980s, through active outreach during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005–2013), to relative neglect under Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021) 2 3 . In recent years, Tehran has refocused on Africa as part of a “Look South” strategy to forge alliances beyond its immediate region 4 5 . This article provides an in-depth analysis of Iran’s contemporary activities in Africa across four key domains: economic relations, political and diplomatic engagements, military and security cooperation, and cultural outreach. It also critically assesses the effectiveness and limitations of Iran’s Africa policy in the face of competition from other powers such as China, Turkey, and the Gulf states. The emphasis is on developments from 2023 onward, drawing on recent data, state visits, agreements, and strategic initiatives.
Iran-Africa Economic Relations (2020–2025)
Trade Growth and Trends: Iran’s trade with Africa has experienced a notable upward trend since 2020, albeit from a low base. According to Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization, annual Iran-Africa trade hovered around $1.2 billion in the late 2010s, constrained by sanctions and limited engagement 6 7 . In 2020, bilateral trade dipped to roughly $650 million, reflecting the impact of sanctions and global economic strains 8 . However, by 2021 the volume had doubled to around $1.3 billion, as Tehran renewed outreach efforts 8 . Trade remained at approximately $1.28 billion in 2022, marking a modest 2% increase in Iran’s fiscal year 1401 (ending March 20, 2023) 9 . A significant uptick occurred in 2023: Iran’s Foreign Ministry projected trade with Africa would exceed $2 billion in 2023, capitalizing on expanded economic diplomacy 4. Tehran has set ambitious targets for the near future – aiming for $3 billion by March 2025 and as much as $10 billion annually within a few years 10 11 . The chart in Figure 1 illustrates the rising trend in Iran-Africa trade volumes from 2020 to 2025, highlighting the sharp growth in 2023 and the 2025 target.
Figure 1: Iran’s trade volume with Africa, 2020–2025. Trade grew from about $0.65 billion in 2020 to an estimated $1.8–2.0 billion in 2023, with a goal of $3 billion by 2025 8 4 .
Trade Composition and Partners: Iran’s exports to Africa consist primarily of non-oil goods such as food products, pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, and engineering services, while its imports from Africa include commodities and raw materials. In the Iranian fiscal year 1401 (2022/23), Iran exported 2.45 million tons worth $1.183 billion to 49 African countries and imported $95 million in goods (mainly minerals and agricultural products) from Africa 12 . Major African trading partners for Iran include South Africa, Mozambique, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Tanzania, among others 13 . South Africa has been Iran’s top African trade partner, with trade growing over 30% in a recent year 13 . For example, Iran’s non-oil exports to South Africa reached $89.5 million in just the first seven months of the 2023 Iranian year 14 , and exports to Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Nigeria have also shown growth 15 16 .
Economic Initiatives and Agreements: Both Iran and African nations have taken steps to facilitate commerce. Iran has established trade centers and exhibitions across Africa – by 2023, at least 10 Iranian trade centers were operating on the continent and multiple trade delegations had been exchanged 17 18 . High-profile events underscore this engagement: Tehran hosted the First Iran–West Africa Economic Summit in March 2023, where contracts worth $1 billion (in sectors such as automotive, shipbuilding, and medical equipment) were signed and proposals for a joint Iran–West Africa bank were raised 19 20 . In April 2024, the Second Iran-Africa Trade Summit convened economy ministers from over 40 African countries in Tehran 21 22 , followed by a Third summit in April 2025. These summits yielded cooperation agreements in sectors like mining, agriculture, energy, and technology 23 24 . Notably, during President Raisi’s July 2023 Africa tour, Iran inked 21 bilateral agreements with Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, ranging from oil and energy to agriculture and telecommunications 25 24 . For example, deals were signed for a $500 million Ugandan agricultural project and an Iranian-supported telecom infrastructure project in Kenya 24 . Iran also agreed to assist Zimbabwe in uranium exploration, reflecting a strategic interest in African minerals 24 .
Trade Finance and Logistics: A key hurdle in Iran-Africa commerce has been the lack of direct banking ties and transport links, often due to sanctions. To address this, Iran is implementing creative solutions. In 2023, Iran opened regular shipping lines to East Africa and even announced plans to establish an Iranian Shipping Lines office on the continent 26 . Barter deals have been pursued – President Raisi noted agreements to barter petrochemical products for African basic goods as a way to work around currency restrictions 27 . Iran’s National Development Fund has earmarked a $2 billion credit line to finance African trade, aimed at enabling Iranian importers to purchase African goods 28 . Additionally, Tehran is exploring dedicated monetary mechanisms and currency swap arrangements to bypass U.S. dollar systems, and increasing the number of joint chambers of commerce and commercial attachés in Africa 29 30 . Such measures are intended to reduce transaction costs and mitigate the risk for traders wary of sanctions-related obstacles. Iranian officials emphasize that improving infrastructure – shipping, air links, banking, and legal frameworks – is crucial to elevating trade with Africa to the $10 billion annual target 31 30 .
Political and Diplomatic Engagements
Renewed High-Level Visits: Political and diplomatic contacts between Iran and African states have intensified since 2022, signaling Africa’s rising priority in Tehran’s foreign policy. After a decade-long hiatus in presidential travel, President Ebrahim Raisi embarked on a three-country Africa tour in July 2023, visiting Kenya (July 12), Uganda (July 13), and Zimbabwe (July 13) 1 . This trip – the first by an Iranian president to Africa in over 10 years – was widely touted in Tehran as a “turning point” in Iran-Africa relations 1 32 . During the tour, Raisi met with his African counterparts, signing cooperation pacts and affirming Iran’s support for Africa’s development. He praised Africa as the “continent of opportunity” and positioned Iran as a partner ready to invest and share technology 33 34 . The visit also carried diplomatic symbolism: Raisi explicitly framed Iran and Africa as partners in resisting Western “colonialism” and exploitation, echoing a South–South solidarity narrative 35 36 .
Timeline of Key Visits (2022–2025): Iran’s outreach has included numerous exchanges of officials at various levels. Below is a timeline of major state visits and diplomatic events since 2022, reflecting Iran’s stepped-up engagement in Africa:
- August 2022: Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian led a high-ranking delegation to Mali and Tanzania, where he met heads of state and convened joint economic commissions 37 38 . In Bamako, he delivered a donation of Iranian COVID-19 vaccines and discussed expanding trade and security ties 39 .
- March 2023: Iran hosted the 1st Iran–West Africa Economic Summit in Tehran, attended by officials from 10+ West African countries. The summit focused on economic cooperation in energy, agriculture, mining, and resulted in ~$1 billion in contracts and proposals for institutional partnerships 40 20 .
- June 2023: Iranian officials participated in multilateral forums with African representation. For instance, Iran’s foreign minister attended the BRICS+ Foreign Ministers meeting in South Africa, reflecting Tehran’s interest in Africa’s role in emerging Global South coalitions 41 42 . (South Africa, as a BRICS member, has notably invited Iran to BRICS events and advocated for Iran’s membership 42.)
- July 2023: President Raisi’s Africa tour – the highlight of recent diplomacy – included meetings with Presidents William Ruto (Kenya), Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), and Emmerson Mnangagwa (Zimbabwe). 21 MOUs were signed on that trip, spanning sectors such as oil, mining, agriculture, technology transfer, and defense cooperation 25 24 . Raisi’s visit underscored Iran’s “look to Africa” policy and was accompanied by a business delegation to explore trade opportunities 43 44 .
- August 2023: FM Amir-Abdollahian traveled to Pretoria, South Africa to co-chair the 15th Joint Iran-South Africa Commission, the first such meeting since 2019 45 . During this visit, Iran and South Africa discussed expanding economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation and finalized multiple agreements 46 . South African President Cyril Ramaphosa also extended an invitation for Iran to participate in the BRICS summit 42 .
- October 2023: Iran restored diplomatic relations with Sudan after a seven-year rupture. The Iranian Foreign Minister visited Khartoum to re-establish ties, coinciding with reports that Iran was supplying drones to Sudan’s army amid Sudan’s internal conflict (see Security section) 25 . This marked a significant geopolitical development, as Sudan had severed ties with Iran in 2016 under Saudi pressure, but the new engagement suggests shifting dynamics in the region.
- February 2024: President Raisi planned a visit to Algeria, to attend a Gas Exporting Countries Forum summit in Algiers and hold bilateral talks 47 . This would be the first Iran-Algeria presidential visit in 14 years 47 . Algeria, a North African heavyweight, has maintained relatively friendly ties with Iran and shares anti-colonial solidarity, making this visit symbolically important 48 49 . (The trip was set for early 2024, indicating Iran’s intent to broaden its Africa outreach beyond sub-Saharan Africa to include the Maghreb.)
- April 2024: Tehran hosted the Second Iran-Africa Summit, with delegates from over 30 African countries, focusing on investment and joint ventures in mining, energy, and agriculture 21 23 . The event ran in parallel with the Iran Expo 2025 trade exhibition, underscoring Iran’s eagerness to showcase its export capacities to African partners 50 .
- April 2025: The Third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Conference convened in Tehran and Isfahan, highlighting four main areas (oil & gas, mining, agriculture, energy) and aiming to translate summit MOUs into action 23 51 . Iranian officials announced plans to increase Iran-Africa trade centers from 13 to 20 and reiterated the goal of $10 billion trade by 2025 52 .
Diplomatic Footprint: Despite the flurry of visits, Iran’s permanent diplomatic footprint in Africa remains relatively modest. Iran maintains about 20 embassies on the continent 53 , which is far fewer than countries like Turkey (44 embassies) or Saudi Arabia (35 embassies) 54 . Still, Tehran has upgraded some missions and sought accreditation to regional bodies. In West Africa, for example, Iran has an active embassy in Senegal and a presence in Nigeria, leveraging those as hubs for outreach in Francophone and Anglophone West Africa respectively. Iran’s engagement also often involves multilateral platforms: it has observer status or partnerships with the African Union and regional organizations, and Iranian presidents and ministers frequently meet African leaders on the sidelines of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) or United Nations gatherings. The recent rapprochement with Saudi Arabia (brokered by China in 2023) may indirectly aid Iran’s diplomacy in Africa by reducing Saudi pressure on African states to isolate Iran 55 . Indeed, analysts note that African governments have shown increased openness to ties with Iran following the Iran-Saudi détente and the Yemen ceasefire 55 .
Iran often pitches itself as a supporter of African sovereignty and an opponent of Western interference. During meetings with African dignitaries, Iranian leaders routinely invoke shared anti-colonial sentiments. For instance, Raisi lauded African “resistance to colonial powers” when hosting Burkina Faso’s foreign minister in 2023 35 56 . This rhetoric resonates in some countries that have recently pushed out French or Western influence (e.g. Mali, Burkina Faso), and Iran seeks to position itself as a like-minded partner in the emerging geopolitical realignment in the Sahel 57 .
Outcomes and Significance: The uptick in diplomatic engagements has already yielded concrete results, such as visa waiver agreements (Iran and Algeria agreed in 2023 to eliminate visas for official and eventually all travelers 58 ) and new bilateral cooperation frameworks (e.g., Iran revived Joint Commissions with South Africa, Nigeria, and others). Moreover, Iran’s successful convening of high-level summits in Tehran has raised its profile in Africa, at least symbolically signaling that Tehran is “back” in Africa. Still, it remains to be seen how fully the signed MOUs will be implemented. Iranian officials acknowledge that past political goodwill did not always translate into economic gains, and they stress the need for follow-through on agreements 59 60 . Nevertheless, Iran’s recent diplomatic activism in Africa has clearly improved its relations with a number of African states and set the stage for deeper ties.
Military and Security Cooperation
Iran’s activities in Africa have extended into the military and security sphere, though often behind the scenes. These engagements range from arms sales and security agreements with states, to reported involvement in conflict zones, to naval diplomacy. Tehran’s goals include securing strategic footholds (such as access to ports and resources), countering Western and rival influence, and marketing its defense technology to new customers 61 62 .
Arms Transfers and Defense Agreements: In recent years, Iran has sought to export its domestically produced military hardware – particularly drones (UAVs) – to willing African partners. During the Ethiopian civil war (2020–2022), Iran emerged as a quiet but important arms supplier to the Ethiopian government. Iranian-manufactured Mohajer-6 combat drones and other military aid were delivered to Ethiopia, helping Addis Ababa counter Tigrayan rebel forces 63 . This support was part of a broader Iran-Ethiopia security rapprochement; in 2023, the two countries signed a security cooperation memorandum of understanding aimed at intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism, solidifying a partnership that had grown out of wartime necessity 64 65 . Ethiopia’s willingness to work with Iran – even as it also maintains ties with Iran’s regional rivals like the UAE and Turkey – reflects a pragmatic approach to acquire any assistance it can in bolstering internal security 66 67 . For Iran, Ethiopia offers a gateway to the strategic Horn of Africa region, especially after neighbors like Sudan and Djibouti severed ties in 2016 under Saudi/UAE pressure 68.
In the Sahel region, Iran has reportedly established defense relationships with some of the new military-led governments. Intelligence reports and analyses suggest that in 2024 Iran arranged drone supply agreements with the junta governments of Mali and Burkina Faso, two countries that have turned away from Western partners 61 . The drones in question include Iran’s Ababil-2 and Mohajer-6 UAVs – relatively low-cost systems suitable for surveillance and light strike missions 61 . There are indications that Iranian military technicians are present on the ground: for example, Iranian personnel in Mali (possibly IRGC advisors) have helped Mali’s air force operate Mohajer-6 drones to strike insurgent targets (such as Tuareg rebel camps), expanding Mali’s capabilities in its fight against jihadist and separatist groups 69 . In Burkina Faso, Iranian assistance reportedly extends to training – the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has allegedly trained elements of Burkina’s elite Cobra unit in urban counterinsurgency tactics 70 . These moves dovetail with Iran’s broader strategy of aligning with the wave of anti-French, anti-West governments in the Sahel, presenting itself as a willing security partner where Western support has receded 57 . It must be noted that much of this information comes from security think-tanks; the governments involved often deny or downplay such partnerships. Nonetheless, the emergence of Iranian drones in African conflict zones marks a new chapter in Tehran’s military outreach – using arms exports as both a revenue source and a geopolitical tool 71 61 .
Naval Presence and Port Access: The Iranian Navy has dramatically increased its blue-water activities, including ports of call in Africa, as part of Iran’s bid to project power and goodwill abroad. A landmark accomplishment was the voyage of the 86th Iranian naval flotilla (comprising the destroyer Dena and the forward-base ship Makran) in 2022–2023, which completed a circumnavigation of the world 72 73 . In March 2023, the 86th flotilla docked in Cape Town, South Africa, for replenishment and diplomatic outreach – a highly publicized event that underscored Iran’s naval reach 72 . The ships were welcomed by Iranian diplomats and local officials in Cape Town, and Iran highlighted that this mission broke the country’s distance sailing record (over 50,000 km traveled) 74 . Iranian naval commanders have established new “ocean commands” for the Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans, signaling an intent for regular deployments far beyond the Persian Gulf 75 . Africa figures in this strategy as a necessary stopover point: Iranian warships have also made port calls in Tanzania and intended to transit the Suez Canal and even the Panama Canal (though the latter was thwarted) 76 77 . These naval forays serve multiple aims – demonstrating Iran’s military presence to both allies and adversaries, protecting Iranian shipping (under sanctions, Iran sometimes disguises oil shipments via African waters), and building naval diplomacy with countries like South Africa, which permitted the port call despite likely Western reservations 78 .
Tehran is also allegedly seeking more permanent access to ports in strategically located African states. Intelligence analysts have speculated that Iran desires a foothold on the Red Sea coast, especially in turmoil-hit Sudan or in the Horn of Africa, to support its naval operations and potentially to facilitate arms smuggling routes 71 . Historically, during the 2000s, Iran enjoyed access to Port Sudan and Eritrea’s Assab port for naval and logistical purposes 79 80 . Those ties were cut in the mid-2010s amid pressure from Gulf states, but the resumption of Iran-Sudan relations in 2023 raises the possibility that Port Sudan could again welcome Iranian vessels 25 . Such developments are closely watched by global powers due to the Red Sea’s strategic importance for international shipping and security.
Involvement in Conflicts and Arms Proliferation: Iran’s security role in Africa has sometimes manifested in covert support to non-state actors or parties in conflicts, as part of its broader proxy strategy. For instance, back in the 2000s and early 2010s, Iran was accused of arming militant groups such as Hamas via Sudan and smuggling weapons to rebels in West Africa 81 82 . In the current decade, one flashpoint is the ongoing war in Sudan (2023–present) between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Iran’s precise role is contested: Bloomberg reported in late 2023 that Iran was supplying drones to the Sudanese Army (SAF) to aid it against the RSF militia 25 . This would align Iran with the official Sudanese military, perhaps as a means to win favor with a potential future government in Khartoum.
On the other hand, an analysis from an Indian observer (NIAS) suggested Iranian loitering munitions had found their way to the RSF side, being used to destroy Sudanese army armor in April 2024 69 . It’s possible that Iranian arms are present on both sides of the conflict, or that reports conflict; what is clear is that Sudan’s instability has drawn Iran’s interest, given Sudan’s past ties with Iran and its location bordering the Red Sea. Separately, Morocco has accused Iran (via its Lebanese ally Hezbollah) of arming the Polisario Front in Western Sahara – a charge Iran denied, but which led Morocco to cut ties in 2018 83 . While that incident predates 2023, it exemplifies how Iran’s ideological and proxy relationships (in this case with Hezbollah) can reverberate in African security issues, exacerbating Iran’s tensions with certain African states (Morocco and some Gulf-aligned states).
Security and Training Cooperation: In addition to hardware, Iran provides training, advising, and intelligence cooperation to some African counterparts. For example, Iran has long-standing security agreements with Nigeria focusing on counter-terrorism and crime (though relations were strained after Nigerian forces clashed with a pro-Iranian Shia group). With Kenya, Iran has a complex history: while Kenyan authorities have foiled alleged IRGC-linked terror plots on their soil, Nairobi has also quietly engaged Tehran on security cooperation and prisoner exchanges, seeking a balance 84 85 . During Raisi’s 2023 visit to Kenya, discussions reportedly touched on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism collaboration, areas where both countries have an interest. Another aspect of Iran’s soft security influence is intelligence sharing: countries facing Islamist insurgencies, such as Mali or Nigeria, have received intelligence tips from Iran on terrorist threats (as Iran positions itself as an anti-ISIS/Al-Qaeda partner).
Overall, Iran’s military and security forays into Africa serve its strategic objectives but are constrained by resources and politics. Iran is eager to capitalize on arms sales – its drones and missiles are significantly cheaper than Western equivalents, making them attractive to some African militaries 86 . At the same time, Iran must navigate not to provoke too much backlash; open Iranian military presence can alarm not only Western powers but also African publics or neighbors. Thus, much of Tehran’s security engagement remains low-profile or deniable. The exception is naval diplomacy, which Iran proudly publicizes as a sign of global reach. In sum, Iran’s security involvement in Africa since 2023 has expanded notably through drone exports and defense agreements, indicating that Africa is increasingly seen in Tehran as both a market for Iran’s defense industry and a theater for strategic competition with its rivals.
Cultural Outreach and Soft Power
Beyond economics and security, Iran leverages cultural and religious diplomacy as a tool of influence in Africa. This soft-power campaign is aimed at building goodwill, fostering ideological affinity, and countering the cultural influence of rivals (notably Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf states). Key facets of Iran’s cultural outreach include religious networks, educational exchanges, media presence, and humanitarian assistance.
Religious and Ideological Networks: Iran, as the leading Shia Muslim-majority country, has historically promoted Shi’a Islamic culture in parts of Africa, though Africa’s Muslim population is overwhelmingly Sunni (with significant Sufi influences) 87 . Since the 1980s, Iran has established Shia cultural centers, mosques, and seminaries in countries with Shia communities or where it sees potential for influence. During Ahmadinejad’s era, for example, Iran opened Islamic centers in West African states like Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Senegal 88 . In recent years, these efforts continue under institutions like Al-Mustafa International University, a Qom-based seminary that recruits international students. As of 2023, Al-Mustafa University hosts approximately 1,200 African seminarians (clerical students), primarily from countries such as Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, and Senegal 89 . These students receive religious training in Iran (often in Qom or Mashhad) with full scholarships, and many return home as influential clerics, spreading Iran’s revolutionary Shi’a ideology or at least fostering a pro-Iran sentiment in their communities 89. This strategy has borne fruit in places like Nigeria, where a Shia minority led by Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky (the Islamic Movement in Nigeria) has espoused loyalty to Iran’s Supreme Leader and replicated Iranian political-religious ceremonies – an example of ideological influence beyond Iran’s borders 90 .
Iran maintains cultural centers in several African capitals that act as hubs for outreach. Notably, Tehran has funded Iranian Cultural Houses in cities such as Dakar (Senegal) and Abuja (Nigeria), where programs include Persian language courses, film screenings, and Islamic seminars 91 . These centers often emphasize shared Islamic heritage and anti-imperialist themes. In Senegal, the Iranian Cultural Center sponsors annual Ashura processions (marking the Shia commemoration of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom) that have attracted as many as 20,000 participants – a remarkable turnout in a Sunni-majority country 89 . Such events not only promote Shi’a rituals but also challenge the influence of Saudi-supported Sunni institutions in West Africa 92 . Similarly, in Tanzania, where a historic Shia community exists (particularly of South Asian origin), Iran has long engaged via support to local Shia charities and schools, and by hosting Tanzanian students in Iranian universities.
Education and Exchange: Iran offers educational scholarships and technical training to Africans as a soft-power tool. Iranian universities admit students from various African nations into medicine, engineering, and humanities programs. For instance, students from countries like Uganda and Nigeria have studied at Iran’s University of Medical Sciences or in oil and gas engineering programs. Additionally, Iran periodically sends medical teams and establishes clinics – under the banner of organizations like the Iranian Red Crescent – in underserved African areas as a humanitarian gesture. One contemporary example is Iran’s donation of COVID-19 vaccines to African countries during the pandemic; as mentioned, Iran gifted vaccine doses to Mali in 2022, which was formally received during FM Amir-Abdollahian’s visit 39 . Iran framed such aid as an Islamic solidarity initiative, which earned goodwill in the recipient countries.
Iran also organizes cultural festivals and delegation exchanges. In 2023, an “Iran Cultural Week” was held in Tanzania, and similar events have been planned for Nigeria and South Africa, featuring Iranian art, films, and books. Conversely, Iran invites African artists and religious scholars to take part in conferences in Tehran or Isfahan. This cultural diplomacy underscores the “historical and civilizational bonds” Iran claims to share with Africa (for example, Iran often references the Persian presence in East Africa centuries ago, or the Iranian origins of some Zanzibar community, to create historical links).
Media Influence: Iranian state media targets African audiences through various channels. Press TV, Iran’s English-language satellite news network, produces programming on African affairs (including the weekly show “Africa Today” on Press TV) which presents news from a pro-Iran, anti-West perspective 93 . In this coverage, Iran highlights African struggles against colonialism or Western double standards, implicitly aligning Iran with those causes. Iran’s Arabic-language channel Al-Alam also reaches North Africa and parts of the Sahel, offering an Iranian view on regional events (often countering narratives from Al Jazeera or Saudi outlets). There is also content in French (to reach Francophone Africa) via Iran’s IRIB World Service and occasional publications. While the direct impact of Iranian media in Africa is limited compared to, say, Qatar’s Al Jazeera or China’s CGTN Africa, it contributes to Iran’s image as a defender of the Global South. Social media has also been used: Iranian-run or sympathetic online outlets push stories of Iran-Africa cooperation and shared opposition to sanctions, trying to shape elite and public opinion in Africa.
Religion and Soft Power Contest: Importantly, Iran’s cultural efforts often compete with Sunni Arab states’ influence. Saudi Arabia and its allies have invested heavily in Africa’s religious sphere – building mosques, funding madrassas, and propagating Sunni orthodoxy (sometimes Wahhabi/Salafi ideology). Iran’s approach has been to find receptive niches: Shia minorities (in Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya), mainstream Muslim communities open to Iran’s message of resistance, and even non-Muslim audiences by portraying itself as anti-imperialist rather than sectarian. For example, Iran has reached out to Christian-majority countries like Zimbabwe and Uganda by emphasizing shared values of anti-colonialism and offering development aid without religious strings. During Raisi’s visit to Uganda, alongside economic deals he pledged support in areas like health and education, projecting Iran as a friend to all Africans, not only Muslim populations 94 95 .
Soft Power Impact: The efficacy of Iran’s soft power in Africa is mixed. In some locales, Iranian-backed religious movements have gained footholds (the Islamic Movement in Nigeria being a case in point, though it has faced state crackdowns). Iran’s narrative of resistance to Western hegemony resonates in African political discourse to an extent – especially in countries where resentment of former colonial powers runs high. Tehran’s alignment with the “Global South” and its support for Pan-Africanist and anti-apartheid causes (Iran was vocally anti-apartheid in the 1980s 96 ) have earned it a measure of respect among older African liberation elites. For instance, South Africa’s ruling party historically appreciated Iran’s boycott of apartheid oil sales 97 , and South Africa today is one of Iran’s closest partners in Africa, regularly calling for sanctions on Iran to be lifted 98 . Iran also partakes in initiatives like the Africa Union’s annual summits as an observer and offers its ideological support to African calls for fairer global governance.
However, Iran’s cultural influence is constrained by several factors. Language is one – Iran’s cultural content is mostly in Persian, Arabic, or English, limiting penetration in rural or francophone areas. The sectarian angle (promoting Shiism) can backfire in predominantly Sunni societies; Iran is sometimes viewed with suspicion by Sunni religious leaders in Africa who see it as exporting sectarian discord 87 . Moreover, Iran’s soft power is undercut by its economic limitations: unlike China (with massive investments) or the Gulf states (with lavish aid and investments in mosques), Iran cannot fund large-scale cultural or development projects due to its sanctioned, strained economy. This has led to situations where Iran’s well-publicized promises (e.g. building hospitals or factories) do not fully materialize, breeding skepticism.
Effectiveness and Limitations of Iran’s Africa Policy
Iran’s renewed engagement in Africa has yielded some positive momentum for Tehran, but it faces significant limitations and competition. Effectiveness can be seen in the modest but real growth of trade and the breaking of diplomatic isolation. African governments, in general, have welcomed Iran’s outreach to diversify their partnerships. The fact that over 40 African countries sent delegations to the Iran-Africa summits in 2024 and 2025 indicates a willingness to explore ties with Iran despite its pariah status in the West 21 23 . Iran’s offers of technology transfer, scholarships, and even military aid appeal to certain states’ immediate needs. In the strategic realm, Iran has managed to reestablish a presence in some regions (e.g., the Horn and Sahel) where it had been squeezed out, exploiting the geopolitical vacuum left by retreating Western powers in those areas 99 . Tehran’s alignment with the prevailing sentiment of sovereignty and non-alignment in Africa (for instance, condemning Western sanctions as unjust and supporting African positions in international forums) has won it diplomatic points. African nations have largely maintained a neutral or sympathetic stance toward Iran in arenas like the UN – for example, many African states either vote against or abstain from anti-Iran resolutions on human rights or nuclear issues, reflecting the relationship-building Iran has done over years.
Nonetheless, the limitations of Iran’s Africa strategy are stark. First and foremost is economic capacity. Iran’s economy, under heavy US sanctions and domestic mismanagement, simply lacks the heft to be a major player in Africa. Even if Iran reaches its $3 billion trade target in 2025, this would be a drop in the bucket compared to other players. For context, China’s trade with Africa was $282 billion in 2023 100 , and even middle powers have outpaced Iran – Turkey-Africa trade is around $34.5 billion, and Saudi-Africa trade about $37.5 billion 101 . The United Arab Emirates (UAE), another of Iran’s regional competitors, boasts $50 billion in Africa trade (2022) – twenty-five times Iran’s volume 102 . This huge gap means Iran cannot compete in big-ticket infrastructure or investment projects that African countries desperately need. Where China builds railways and industrial parks, or the Gulf states finance dams and telecom networks, Iran can usually only offer smaller-scale projects or barter arrangements. Indeed, at the 2024 summit, African attendees reportedly questioned Iran’s capacity to deliver on its promises given Iran’s economic struggles under sanctions 103 . The skepticism among African partners is a real challenge: Iran’s past MOUs often did not materialize, breeding doubt about new deals 103 .
Secondly, diplomatic reach is a limitation. With barely 20 embassies, Iran is not physically present in the majority of African countries 53 . This limits its ability to engage continuously or to respond quickly to opportunities. By contrast, countries like Turkey over the past decade opened embassies in nearly every African nation and ingrained themselves through aid agencies (TIKA), educational networks, and high-profile summits every few years. Turkey and Iran share some goals (both pitch themselves as anti-colonial, Muslim partners), but Turkey’s execution has been far more robust in Africa, yielding it significant economic and political clout. Iran’s insular focus during the Rouhani years (2013–2021) meant it fell behind in the “new scramble for Africa” where even middle-income countries scrambled to make inroads 3 . Tehran is now playing catch-up, but it may be too late to substantially reverse its low ranking in Africa’s partner hierarchy.
Third, security and political constraints impede Iran’s Africa policy. Many African governments remain cautious not to jeopardize relations with the West or Gulf Arabs by getting too close to Iran. For instance, countries like Morocco, Sudan, Djibouti, Senegal have in the past severed or downgraded ties with Iran under Saudi/UAE pressure 68 . While the recent Saudi-Iran rapprochement might reduce such pressure, Gulf states (and Israel) still actively compete with Iran in Africa. The Abraham Accords have led Israel and Gulf countries to jointly invest in Africa (e.g., in security in the Red Sea, agriculture in Sudan and Morocco), in part to counter Iranian influence. Where Iran tries to foster military links (like selling drones to certain regimes), it risks entanglement in conflicts that could backfire. For example, if Iranian arms in the Sahel do not decisively help those regimes or if they fall into the wrong hands, Iran could be seen as fueling instability. Moreover, internal unrest in Iran and its need to prioritize relations with great powers (China, Russia) could divert attention from Africa. Iran’s bandwidth is limited; if nuclear negotiations with the West resume or domestic economic crises escalate, Africa might again become a lower priority.
Finally, Iran faces the soft-power challenge of winning hearts and minds in Africa in competition with other narratives. China offers a development model and big investments; the West (Europe/US) still wields historical ties and significant aid; Gulf states offer religious solidarity (for Sunnis) and financial largesse. Iran’s soft power, rooted in revolutionary ideology and cultural exchange, appeals to only a niche audience. In many African countries, public awareness of Iran is minimal or defined largely by international media (often negative coverage of Iran’s nuclear program or human rights record). Iran’s support for groups labeled as terrorists by the West (like Hezbollah or Hamas) can also complicate African relations, especially in countries aligning with the US on counterterrorism.
In summary, Iran’s Africa policy since 2023 has been energetic and in certain respects fruitful – it has opened new economic channels, signed numerous agreements, and positioned itself rhetorically alongside Africa in global forums. Iran has demonstrated that it can be an alternative partner for African states seeking diversification, and it has leveraged the current geopolitical moment (non-alignment resurgence, great power competition) to its advantage. However, the impact remains limited by Iran’s constrained resources and the strong headwinds of competition. Iran is and will likely remain a minor player in Africa compared to China, the EU, or even Turkey and the Gulf states. Tehran’s challenge moving forward is to sustain the initiatives it has started – to follow through on trade and investment commitments in Africa despite economic sanctions at home, and to maintain diplomatic engagement across administrations. If it cannot deliver tangible benefits to African partners, enthusiasm for Iran’s overtures may wane. On the other hand, if global geopolitical shifts continue to reduce Western dominance in Africa, Iran may find more breathing room to pursue its interests. In essence, Iran’s activities in Africa post-2023 show a country eager to expand its influence and break isolation, achieving some success on a small scale, yet facing structural obstacles and heavyweight rivals in the African arena.
Sources: The analysis above draws on a range of recent data and reports, including trade statistics from Iranian officials 9 4 , accounts of diplomatic visits from Iranian and international media 1 25 , security developments from think-tank studies 61 69 , and expert assessments of Iran’s geopolitical strategy 54 101. These sources collectively provide insight into the multi-faceted nature of Iran’s engagement in Africa and its evolving context in the period 2023–2025.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 18, 19, 20, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 54, 55, 56, 83, 88, 94, 95, 101 Iran’s Outreach to Africa: Quest for
Influence - Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India)
https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=9950&lid=6356
6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 17, 43, 44 Africa, a proper market for Iranian products - Tehran Times
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/486783/Africa-a-proper-market-for-Iranian-products
10 Iran’s trade with Africa reaches $1.3 billion | Iran Chamber Newsroom
https://en.otaghiranonline.ir/news/45660
14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 26, 27 Iran-Africa trade - Tehran Times
https://www.tehrantimes.com/tag/Iran-Africa+trade
23, 50, 51, 52 3rd Iran-Africa Int'l Economic Conference Kicks off in Tehran
https://iranpress.com/content/304214/3rd-iran-africa-intl-economic-conference-kicks-off-tehran
24, 57, 61, 62, 69, 70, 89, 91, 92, 99, 103 Iran in Africa: Strategic Interests and Expanding Footprints
https://globalpolitics.in/africa/africa-weekly.php?url=NIAS%20Africa%20Studies&recordNo=1604
25, 47, 48, 49, 58 Iran’s Raisi to make first visit to Algeria in 14 years as Africa ties grow - AL-Monitor: The Middle Eastʼs
leading independent news source since 2012
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/02/irans-raisi-make-first-visit-algeria-14-years-africa-ties-grow
28, 29, 30, 31, 59, 60 Iran, Africa ink trade, investment deals in 4 key sectors - Tehran Times
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/512591/Iran-Africa-ink-trade-investment-deals-in-four-key-sectors
37, 38, 39 Iran FM starts tour of Africa, visits Mali - Tehran Times
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/475996/Iran-FM-starts-tour-of-Africa-visits-Mali
41 Hossein Amir Abdollahian - Tehran Times
https://www.tehrantimes.com/tag/Hossein+Amir+Abdollahian?mn=6&wide=0&dy=11&ms=0&pi=13&yr=2025
42, 45, 46 Amir-Abdollahian to attend Iran-South Africa meeting - Mehr News Agency
https://en.mehrnews.com/news/204327/Amir-Abdollahian-to-attend-Iran-South-Africa-meeting
53, 68, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, 90, 96, 97, 98, 102 Iranian Infiltration of Africa | UANI
https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/iranian-infiltration-of-africa
63, 64, 65, 66, 67 Iran and Ethiopia have a security deal – here’s why they signed it | FIU News - Florida International University
https://news.fiu.edu/2025/iran-and-ethiopia-have-a-security-deal-heres-why-they-signed-it
71 Africa File, May 2, 2024: Iran Pursues Economic and Military Influence
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-may-2-2024-iran-pursues-economic-and-military-influence
72, 73, 74, 75 Iranian Flotilla Makes Port Call in South Africa - Politics news - Tasnim News Agency
https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2023/04/01/2873986/iranian-flotilla-makes-port-call-in-south-africa
76 Iranian Navy Surface Action Group Docked in South Africa, Satellite ...
https://news.usni.org/2023/04/06/iranian-navy-surface-action-group-docked-in-south-africa-satellite-photos-reveal
77 Iranian Navy 86th flotilla docks at Port of Cape Town in South Africa
https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2023/03/31/700742/Iran-South-Africa-Cape-Town-flotilla-fleet-Makran-Dena-Mehdi-Aqa-Jafari-
78 Keeping good company? Russia, China, now Iran navy ties up in SA
https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2023-04-03-keeping-good-company-russia-china-now-iran-navy-ties-up-in-sa/
86 Military Drone Proliferation Marks Destabilizing Shift in Africa's ...
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/drone-proliferation-africa-destabilizing/
93 Iran prioritizes ties with Africa
https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2022/09/05/688633/Iran-Prioritizes-Ties-with-Africa
100 China-Africa trade reaches $282 billion in 2023, yet widening trade deficit in Africa, attributed to commodity price influences. – Diplo
https://www.diplomacy.edu/updates/china-africa-trade-reaches-282-billion-in-2023-yet-widening-trade-deficit-in-africa-attributed-to-commodity-price-influences/
